Brendan de Kenessey

[pre-publication draft] [published version]

Contractualism and rule consequentialism both hold that whether a moral principle is true depends on what would happen if it were generally adopted as a basis for conduct. This paper argues that any theory with this feature faces a profound epistemic problem. The question of what would happen if different moral principles were generally adopted is a complex empirical question, comparable in difficulty to the question of what would happen if a nation adopted different laws, or if humanity had evolved different traits. Reflection on the epistemic demands of this question shows that we have no clue what would happen if different moral principles were generally adopted. This leads to a surprising result: we have no clue what contractualism and rule consequentialism imply about what actions are morally right and wrong. The only way for these theories to avoid cluelessness is to test principles on groups small enough to be epistemically tractable, which requires accepting an implausibly extreme form of moral relativism. I conclude that we must reject contractualism, rule consequentialism, and any other moral theory that entails that the truth of a moral principle depends on what would happen if it were generally adopted.

[open access published version]

This paper argues that there are two importantly distinct normative relations that can be referred to using phrases like ‘X is obligated to Y,’ ‘Y has a right against X,’ or ‘X wronged Y.’ When we say that I am obligated to you not to read your diary, one thing we might mean is that I am subject to a deontological constraint against reading your diary that gives me a non-instrumental, agent-relative reason not to do so, and which you are typically in a unique position to waive with consent. I call this first relation the constraint relation. A second thing we might mean is that you are in a position to fittingly hold me personally accountable for reading your diary by demanding that I not read your diary, resenting me if I do so without excuse, and deciding whether to forgive me for this afterwards. I call this second relation the accountability relation. Though these two kinds of directed obligation often coincide, I argue that they are extensionally dissociable and play different normative roles. We cannot provide an adequate theory of ‘obligation to’ until we recognize that this phrase denotes not one relation, but two.

[pre-publication draft] [published version]

What is the relation between moral reasons and moral requirement? Specifically: what relation does an action have to bear to one’s moral reasons in order to count as morally required? This paper defends the following answer to this question: an action is morally required just in case the moral reasons in favor of that action are enough on their own to outweigh all of the reasons, moral and nonmoral, to perform any alternative. I argue that this decisive moral reason view satisfies three key desiderata: it is compatible with either affirming or denying the existence of moral options; it vindicates moral rationalism, the thesis that an action can be morally required only if one ought to do it all things considered; and most distinctively, it explains why unexcused moral wrongdoing necessarily shows disregard for moral reasons.

[open access published version]

If I promise to pick you up at the airport, I thereby become obligated to do so. But this is not the only way I could undertake this obligation. If I offer to pick you up, and you accept my offer, I become obligated to pick you up in much the same way. I would also undertake similar obligations if you asked me to pick you up and I accepted your request, or if we made an agreement that I will pick you up at the airport and in exchange you’ll buy me dinner. Why are the normative effects of accepted offers, accepted requests, and agreements so similar to those of promises? I argue that theorists of promising need to answer this question, and so they need to pay attention to offers, requests, and agreements. On the theory I defend, promises, offers, requests, and agreements have such similar normative effects because they all result in joint decisions between the relevant parties. I argue that this ‘joint decision view’ provides an attractive explanation of the similarities and differences between promises, offers, requests, and agreements.

[pre-publication draft] [published version]

This paper argues that promises are proposals in joint practical deliberation, the activity of deciding together what to do. More precisely: to promise to ϕ is to propose (in a particular way) to decide together with your addressee(s) that you will ϕ. I defend this deliberative theory by showing that the activity of joint practical deliberation naturally gives rise to a speech act with exactly the same properties as promises. A certain kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding one's own actions turns out to have the very same normative effects, under the very same conditions, as a promise. I submit that this cannot be a coincidence: we should conclude that promises and the relevant kind of proposals in joint practical deliberation are one and the same.

[pre-publication draft] [published version]

We argue that experimental work on moral motivation both lends support to and is illuminated by certain philosophical theses about the conceptual connections between moral obligation, blame and guilt, and interpersonal accountability.

[open access published version]

We propose a unified model of self-control conflict that aims to capture the psychological mechanisms underlying both addiction and ordinary temptation. The upshot of our model is that the self-control challenge faced by addicted persons is not different in kind from that faced by non-addicted persons, though of course the former is far more difficult.

[draft]

Depression involves a breakdown in the ability to appreciate the good. This paper argues that by studying this breakdown, we can learn something about how to experience value well. The empirical evidence suggests that many cases of depression are caused by the perception that an all-important goal is impossible to attain. Thus many depressed people’s evaluative experience is focused on states of affairs, on how the actual world compares with the world they desire. I argue that this fixation on states of affairs is what alienates the depressed from the good. The solution is to redirect one’s attention to the value of concrete particulars: persons, animals, artworks, activities, places, experiences. Unlike states of affairs, particulars’ value is not relative to a standard of comparison, and persists even when the world falls short of one’s desires. I conclude that the fitting way to appreciate the good is to focus on the value of particular things – and more tentatively, that particulars, not states of affairs, are the fundamental bearers of value.

Status: first draft, lots of work still to be done

[draft]

This paper presents a novel theory of joint intention. On the view I propose, joint intentions are an element in the ‘score’ of a wider activity, much as strikes are an element in the score of baseball. I call this activity shared agency. Like a game, shared agency is an activity structured by constitutive rules and a score that represents the current state of the activity. When my partner and I jointly decide to go on a walk, we thereby update the score of our activity of shared agency to include a joint intention to do so. This change in score makes it the case that the rules of shared agency require us to go on a walk. This scorekeeping theory of joint intention has two advantages. First, unlike most individualist accounts, the scorekeeping theory allows joint intentions to persist in the absence of corresponding individual intentions. I argue that this enables us to better capture the normative force of joint intentions. Second, unlike most anti-individualist accounts, the scorekeeping theory explains how facts about joint intention are grounded in facts about individual attitudes and interactions.

Status: under review

[draft]

What distinguishes moral reasons from other reasons for action? I defend the following answer: moral reasons are the reasons that bear on the question of what I am to do as asked from a universal perspective of joint practical deliberation that includes all morally competent persons.

[draft]

What is the relation between my being obligated to you to do some action and my being morally obligated to do it? This paper argues that we should not answer this question by reducing one of these statuses to the other. Each kind of obligation can obtain in the other’s absence: I can be obligated to a particular person to f without being morally obligated to f, and I can be morally obligated to f without being obligated to any particular person to f. Instead, I propose that moral and directed obligation are two instances of a more general relation, the obligation relation. On this parallel relations view, I have a directed obligation to you when I bear the obligation relation to you, and I have a moral obligation when I bear the obligation relation to the group of all morally competent persons.

Status: previously completed paper, now undergoing major renovations

[talk handout]

Two of the most salient symptoms of depression are extreme negative attitudes towards oneself and an inability to enjoy the world. I think that these symptoms are connected: a lack of self-love blocks enjoyment of the good. This motivates this paper’s thesis: to appreciate good things in a way that contributes to one’s well-being, one must first love oneself. The core idea of the argument is that to enjoy something fully, in a way that contributes to your well-being, it isn't enough to just experience pleasure: you have to view yourself as unconditionally deserving of receiving the goodness of what you are enjoying, and this requires self-love.

Status: given as a talk, draft in progress

[talk handout]

I argue for a philosophical gloss on the cliché "journey over destination." Many objective-list-style value theories hold that achievements are intrinsically valuable. I argue against this view. The apparent value of achievements such as summiting Everest or discovering special relativity is actually located not in the achievements themselves, but in the activities that lead to them. Moreover, the value of activities is not directly proportional to the extent to which they are achievements. Activities that lead to achievements are valuable in the same way as, and for the same reasons as, activities that don't involve achievements at all, such as playing with your children or having a deep conversation with friends.

Status: given as a talk, draft in progress

[link]

An interview with Salem Kakish and Fei Zhou in Noesis, University of Toronto’s undergraduate philosophy journal, on topics ranging from how to stay sane in graduate school to my recent research on depression.

[link]

Drawing on my own experiences with depression, I ask what, if anything, philosophy might have to say about it. I suggest that depression involves a breakdown in the depressed person’s relationship with the good, and that by studying how this breakdown happens, we might learn something about the correct way to appreciate value. (This is a brief statement of the ideas I am pursuing in "Depression and the Appreciation of Value").

[link]

I talk with Josh Bury from theScore esports about the controversy surrounding the YouTube philanthropist MrBeast. MrBeast is famous for videos in which he does charitable deeds like giving a homeless person $10,000 in cash or paying for 1000 people to get cataract surgery. Bury and I discuss why some people find MrBeast’s videos morally repellent despite their philanthropic aims, distinguishing different objections that might be raised.

[link]

Written while Donald Trump was in the hospital with Covid-19, this piece looks at theories of the value of punishment to determine whether Trump’s suffering from Covid has any retributive value. My answer: no, because suffering caused by a disease cannot play the justice-restoring role that makes punishment worthwhile.

[link]

One of 5 winners of the 2019 APA Public Philosophy Op-Ed Contest

Argues that many harmful-but-persistent ways of thinking about addiction may be implicitly based in the Socratic assumption that people always do what they think is best. Suggests that attending to the divided nature of the mind might help us adopt a more sympathetic and productive approach to addiction.

[link]

Tries to explain why James Lenman's paper "Consequentialism and Cluelessness" has me completely stumped.

Fall 2024

I will be on research leave in the Fall and not teaching any courses.

Winter 2025

PHL 244: Human Nature

[previous syllabus - subject to change!]

In this course, we will investigate three central questions about our nature as human beings. First, what are we? Are we immaterial souls, collections of memories and other psychological states, physical bodies, or something else? Second, are we good or evil? Are human beings innately selfish, or are we capable of genuine moral virtue? Third, do we have free will? Can we be held responsible for our actions if they are the inevitable result of the laws of nature?

PHL 407: Seminar in Ethics

Well-Being, Value, and the Meaning of Life

[previous syllabus - subject to change!]

This course investigates several topics under the broad heading of value theory: what is valuable, and what is it to be valuable? We will focus on three value concepts: well-being, or what is good for a person; goodness ‘simpliciter’; and meaning in life.

Questions we will investigate include: what is it for a person to be well-off, or have a good life? Which concept is more fundamental, ‘good’ or ‘good for’? What is it to be good? What are the bearers of value: states of affairs, or things like persons or beautiful objects? What is it for a life to be meaningful? What is the value of pursuing achievement? And finally, is the meaning or value of our lives diminished by our cosmic insignificance relative to the enormity of space and time?

Undergraduate

Human Nature (PHL 244): 2018 (F), 2019 (F), 2024 (S), 2025 (S)

Doing Good: Consequentialism in Ethics (PHL 375): 2019 (S), 2020 (S), 2022 (S), 2023 (S, F)

Well-Being, Value, and the Meaning of Life (PHL 407): 2023 (S), 2024 (S), 2025 (S)

Ethics in Personal Relationships (PHL 407): 2020 (S), 2022 (S)

Lying (PHL 407): 2019 (S)

Graduate

The Self and Normativity (with David Barnett): 2023 (F)

Morality and Accountability: 2019 (F)

PhD Proseminar, Values, Rules, and Beyond (with Tom Hurka): 2018 (F)

Review of Nicolas Cornell, Wrongs and Rights Come Apart, Ethics, forthcoming

[pre-publication draft]

Review of Hanno Sauer, Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2019

[open access published version]

Review of Anthony Simon Laden, Reasoning: A Social Picture, Philosophical Review, 2016

[pre-publication draft][published version]

My birth name is Brendan Dill, and I used this name personally and professionally until May 2015, when I married Dee Dee de Kenessey and took her last name as my own. de Kenessey is a great name, but is apt to cause citation errors. Here's some clarification.

How to alphabetize 'de Kenessey': ignore the 'de'. 'de Kenessey' should be listed under K, e.g. between 'Kant' and 'Kripke'. (That’s where I belong, right?). See Kai von Fintel's excellent guide to alphabetizing prefixes like 'von' and 'de' in BibTex.

How to cite papers published under Brendan Dill: In the text, cite the paper under 'de Kenessey,' as in (de Kenessey and Darwall 2014). In the bibliography, alphabetize under 'de Kenessey' and include a note indicating the name the article was originally published under, e.g. "Originally published under the name Brendan Dill."

My University of Toronto page

My PhilPeople page

My Academia.edu page

My Google Scholar page